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omitting quotation marks. Of course, in matter
which is indented all quotation marks, whether dou-
ble or single, appearing therein must be used.
Helpful Forms: In the printed transcript of Record or Re-
turn which was prepared by careful attorneys in Norris v.
Bryant et al. in 1949 the writer found not only substantial
but useful forms of petitions, notices and orders relative to
pre-trial examination of parties under Sections 26-501 to
26-512. As long as there is a lack of legislative and judicial
action with respect to providing for pre-trial conferences in
South Carolina the above Sections, lacking though they are
in aiding parties to produce before a court all the necessary
facts to attain justice as well as to save time and undue ex-
pense, must be resorted to for what they are worth. Hence it
is well that trial attorneys have ready access to any helpful
forms that will make the Sections easier of application. To-
ward that end the reader will find below that part of the
Transcript of Record dealing with this phase of preparedness
for trial, even including the brief examination of the parties.
Attention is called to the fact that the names of the attor-
neys have been changed, as the writer didn't want to appear
to the Bar as advertising any of its members in what would
be a permanent volume. And the names which have been
substituted are not fictitious; they existed among the old Eng-
lish barristers, the fore-runners of the American Bars of
today.
PROCEEDINGS FOR PRE-TRIAL EXAMINATION
It is agreed that the following - pages contain the plain-
tiff's petitions and notices of motions and a correct sum-
mary of the proceedings for pre-trial examinations of the
defendants, Grant, Chappell and Bryant and of Thomas J.
Mitchell, the manager of the defendant, Poinsett, and to com-
pel production of the contracts or agreements relied on by
certain of the respondents as a defense to the cause of action
alleged in the amended complaint. The petitions and notices
of motion for the relief therein sought were served upon the
parties and their counsel as provided by law.
PETITION
Omitting the caption the following is plaintiff's verified
petition of September 12, 1947:
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TO: THE HONORABLE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
HITCHIN COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA
Your petitioner respectfully shows:
1. That he is the plaintiff in the above entitled action which
is now pending trial; that by answer in said action made de-
fendant, Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company, alleges
that the truck and trailer in question were not under its super-
vision, control or direction and that its co-defendant, Taft
Chappell, was an independent contractor engaged in the log-
ging business at the time mentioned and that Roy Bryant
was employed by him and under his sole and exclusive direc-
tion; that the petitioner is advised, the information having
been furnished to the attorney for petitioner by John Breare,
of the firm of Harmsworth & Harmsworth, attorneys for de-
fendant, Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company, that
Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company on the trial of
this case intends to rely, for purpose of defense, upon a con-
tract in writing in the possession of said defendant executed
between said defendant and one S. C. Grant, a brother-in-law
of the defendant, Taft Chappell; that the defendant, Taft
Chappell, has told this petitioner that he hired Roy Bryant,
that his brother-in-law, S. C. Grant, hired him and that Poin-
sett Lumber & Manufacturing Company hired Grant under
a contract in writing, which said defendant had seen, to log
and haul the logs from timber lands owned by Poinsett Lum-
ber & Manufacturing Company in the mountains of Hitchin
County to the sawmill of Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing
Company at Hitchin; petitioner is further informed by other
persons similarly employed by Poinsett Lumber & Manufac-
turing Company that this is the method of operation used
by said defendant in the operation of its large holdings of
timber land and its sawmill in Hitchin County; that on the
18th day of July, 1947, the petitioner through his attorney,
Amigel Wade, made written demand upon Messrs. Harms-
worth & Harmsworth, Attorneys' for Poinsett Lumber &
Manufacturing Company, for a copy of the contract or that
the contract be filed with the Clerk of Court of Hitchin
County in order that petitioner might procure a copy thereof;
that, upon information and belief, some several days there-
after Mr. William Brigg, an attorney and member or asso-
ciate of the law firm of Harmsworth & Harmsworth, ad-
vised the attorney for petitioner by telephone that said law
[Vol. 11
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firm would not deliver the contract to the attorney for peti-
tioner, that they would not allow the attorney for petitioner to
inspect and copy the same and would not file the same in the
office of the Clerk of Court of Hitchin County in order that
the attorney for petitioner might copy or inspect the same;
that thereafter on the 6th day of September, 1947, the said
William Brigg, upon behalf of the law firm of Harmsworth
& Harmsworth, attorneys for defendants, served upon the
attorney for petitioner a notice of a motion to be made before
the Resident or Presiding Judge of the 13th Judicial Circuit
at Gruenwald, South Carolina, on September 19, 1947; that
at the time of the service of said notice of motion, as peti-
tioner is informed and believes, petitioner's attorney again
made personal demand upon said William Brigg, attorney, for
a copy of the aforesaid contract; that he at said time admit-
ted the existence of such a contract and again refused to make
the same accessible in any manner to petitioner or his at-
torney; that Thomas J. Mitchell, a resident of Hitchin County,
South Carolina, is the manager of Poinsett Lumber & Manu-
facturing Company at Hitchin, South Carolina, and as such
manager is in the immediate control and direction of all busi-
ness transactions and property and papers of said defendant
in said County and is, therefore, in the possession of the
aforesaid contract; that on the 11th day of September, 1947,
the petitioner made personal demand upon the said Thomas
J. Mitchell to be allowed to inspect the aforesaid contract as
to the content thereof or to make a copy thereof or that the
said Thomas J. Mitchell file the same with the Clerk of Court
of Hitchin County in order that petitioner might inspect the
same or make a copy thereof; that the said Thomas J. Mitchell
denied the petitioner the right to in any manner secure knowl-
edge as to the content of the contract.
2. That petitioner is informed and believes that Messrs.
Harmsworth & Harmsworth, attorneys, have refused to an-
swer by letter the letter of the attorney for petitioner re-
questing a copy of the contract or inspection thereof.
3. That the plaintiff was not present at the scene of the
operation of the business of the defendant, Poinsett Lumber
& Manufacturing Company, in the cutting and logging of
timber from said defendant's lands in the mountains of
Hitchin County, South Carolina, 'and was not present during
3
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the hauling of said logs by truck to the sawmill of said de-
fendant near the Town of Hitchin, which operations resulted
in plaintiff's injuries; that the kind, amount and extent of
the supervision, control or direction and of the right thereto
is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, Poinsett
Lumber and Manufacturing Company, and its agents and
servants, and are peculiarly within the personal knowledge
of Thomas J. Mitchell, the said manager of said defendant.
4. That for the reasons hereinabove set out the plaintiff is
entitled to an order of Court, pursuant to the provisions
of Section 673 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1942,
requiring the defendant, Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing
Company, and its manager, Thomas J. Mitchell, to give to the
petitioner within a specified time an inspection and copy, or
permission to make a copy of the aforesaid contract upon
which the said defendant intends to base its defense that an
independent contractor performed the logging operations and
the hauling of the logs from the lands of the defendants in
the mountains of Hitchin County, South Carolina, which op-
erations resulted in the injuries to petitioner in order that the
plaintiff may have opportunity before trial to study the law
with reference to the content of said contract and to study
and investigate the facts surrounding the operation thereof;
and further that petitioner is entitled to an order of the Court
under the provisions of Section 674 through 682 of the Code
of Laws of South Carolina of 1942, to an examination of the
said Thomas J. Mitchell, of Hitchin, in Hitchin County, South
Carolina, the manager of the defendant, Poinsett Lumber &
Manufacturing Company, as in said statute provided, concern-
ing the matter within the knowledge of the said Poinsett
Lumber & Manufacturing Company and its manager, the
said Thomas J. Mitchell, as to the facts and circumstances
of their operation resulting in the injuries to the petitioner,
and particularly as to the facts and circumstances surround-
ing their claimed defense that the party with whom they had
contracted to perform their logging operations and hauling
was as an independent contractor, responsible for injuries to
the petitioner including the facts of the extent of the super-
vision, control or direction of Poinsett Lumber & Manufac-
turing Company over said operations and hauling and its
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WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays:
(1) that the Court order the defendant, Poinsett Lumber
& Manufacturing Company, and also its manager, Thomas J.
Mitchell, to give to the petitioner within a specified time
an inspection and copy or permission to make a copy of the
aforesaid contract or contracts;
(2) that the Court order and direct the said Thomas J.
Mitchell to appear in person before the Court or a Special
Referee to be appointed under the provisions of Section 677
Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1942, at the time and
place designated in said order, to be examined as a witness
as to the content of the contract between Poinsett Lumber
and Manufacturing Company and its alleged independent con-
tractor and as to the facts and circumstances surrounding
the operation which resulted in the injuries to the petitioner,
including the extent of the supervision, control and direction
of Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company over said op-





The following notice of motion was served with the above
petition:
TO: MESSRS. HARMSWORTH & HARMSWORTH,
GRUENWALD, SOUTH CAROLINA, ATTORNEYS
FOR THE DEFENDANTS IN THE ABOVE EN-
TITLED ACTION, AND TO MR. THOMAS J. MIT-
CHELL, HITCHIN, SOUTH CAROLINA, THE
MANAGER OF POINSETT LUMBER & MANUFAC-
TURING COMPANY:
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that based upon the plead-
ings in this action and upon the attached petition and affi-
davit, the undersigned, the attorney for the plaintiff in the
above entitled action, will move before the Resident or Pre-
siding Judge of the 13th Judicial Circuit at Chambers or in
open Court in Gruenwald County Court House, at 10:00
o'clock, A.M., on September 19, 1947, or as soon thereafter
as counsel may be heard and upon the conclusion of the hear-
ing of the motion in said action heretofore made by attorneys
5
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for defendants and at said time noticed, for an order re-
quiring the defendant, Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing
Company, and Thomas J. Mitchell, its manager, to (1) give
to the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, within a specified time
an inspection and copy or permission to make a copy of the
contract relied upon by the defendant, Poinsett Lumber &
Manufacturing Company, to establish its defense that an in-
dependent contractor was responsible for injuries to plaintiff-
petitioner which said contract is more particularly described
in the annexed petition; (2) an order requiring the said
Thomas J. Mitchell, the Manager of Poinsett Lumber & Manu-
facturing Company, to appear before the Court or a Special
Referee appointed by the Court under the provisions of Sec-
tion 677 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1942, to
be examined as a witness as to the contract and the content
thereof referred to in the annexed petition and upon which the
defendant, Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company, in-
tends to rely to establish its defense that an independent con-
tractor is alone responsible for the injuries to the plaintiff,
and as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the log-
ging and hauling of logs from the lands of the defendant,
Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company, in the moun-
tains of Hitchin County, South Carolina, to its sawmill at
Hitchin, -South Carolina, and as a result of which operations
the injuries to the plaintiff-petitioner resulted. The plaintiff-
petitioner will ask the Court that the order specify particu-
larly that the plaintiff-petitioner be allowed to examine as a
witness the said Thomas J. Mitchell particularly as to the
content of any written or verbal contract relating to the cut-
ting, logging and hauling of logs from the lands of the de-
fendant, Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company, in the
mountains of Hitchin County, South Carolina, to its sawmill
located near the Town of Hitchin, and as to the control and
right of control over the said operations exercised and re-
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FIRST ORDER
After a hearing on the above petition and notice Judge
Martin made an order on June 8, 1948, as follows:
This matter comes before me upon application of the plain-
tiff for a pre-trial examination of the defendants, Roy Bryant,
Taft Chappell and S. C. Grant, and of Thomas J. Mitchell,
Manager of the defendant, Poinsett Lumber and Manufac-
turing Company, and upon an application of the plaintiff to
require the defendant, Poinsett Lumber and Manufactur-
ing Company, to give to the plaintiff within a specified
time an inspection and copy or permission to make a copy
of the contract relied upon by the defendant, Poinsett Lum-
ber and Manufacturing Company, or that such defendant be
required to file such contract with the Clerk of Court of
Hitchin County in order that the plaintiff may make a copy
thereof or inspect the same.
The matter was heard by me at Hitchin, South Carolina, on
June 8, 1948. Mr. William Brigg of the firm of Harmsworth
& Harmsworth appeared for the defendants named in the
amended complaint other than S. C. Grant. No appearance
was made by the defendant, S. C. Grant. The plaintiff and
subrogee were represented by their attorneys of record.
The Court is engaged in a term of General Sessions Court
of Hitchin County and could not at this time undertake to
fully dispose of all questions raised by the applications. How-
ever, the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled
to an immediate examination of Mr. Thomas J. Mitchell,
Manager of Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing Company,
as to the contents of any contract or contracts then existing
between the said Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing Com-
pany, as to the contents of any contract or contracts then
existing between the said Poinsett Lumber and Manufactur-
ing Company and any of the defendants named in the amend-
ed complaint relating to the logging and hauling operations
growing out of which the plaintiff was injured, and further
the Court is of the opinion that the defendant, Poinsett Lum-
ber and Manufacturing Company, and its manager, Thomas
J. Mitchell, should be compelled to immediately make such
contract or contracts as existed available to the plaintiff
in order that the plaintiff and the statutory subrogee may
have a pre-trial inspection and copy thereof, or that such de-
7
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fendant, and its manager be required to file the contract or
contracts with the Clerk of Court of Hitchin County for such
purpose.
Therefore, upon motion of the Attorneys for the plaintiff
and subrogee in this action,
IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Thomas J. Mitchell, Manager
of Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing Company, do per-
sonally appear and present himself before Hon. W. E. Findley,
a member of the Hitchin Bar, as a Special Referee, at his
office in the South Carolina National Bank building in
Hitchin, South Carolina, at 10:30 o'clock, A.M., on Friday,
June 11, 1948, then and there and at such other and further
time as by the Referee may be so directed, to be examined
under oath by the Attorneys for plaintiff and subrogee, as to
any contract or contracts between the defendant, Poinsett
Lumber and Manufacturing Company, and any of the defend-
ants named in the amended complaint in anywise relating to
the logging and hauling operations growing out of which the
plaintiff, Fields F. Norris, was injured.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon said examination
that the defendant, Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing
Company, be and they are hereby required to then and there
produce any such contract or contracts relating to such log-
ging and hauling operations in order that the plaintiff may
have pre-trial access to such contract or contracts and the
content and provisions thereof.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Special Referee do
immediately upon the conclusion of said hearing make and file
with the Clerk of this Court his report of the testimony taken
and that he do file with said report the contract or contracts
herein ordered to be produced.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any and all other issues
raised by the motions of the plaintiff and subrogee for pre-
trial examination of the other named defendants and for the
further pre-trial examination of Mr. Thomas J. Mitchell,
Manager of Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing Company, as
set forth in the motions presented, be and the same are hereby
reserved.
Let a certified copy of this Order be personally served upon
Mr. Thomas J. Mitchell, the manager of Poinsett Lumber
[Vol. 11224
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and Manufacturing Company, by the Sheriff of Hitchin
County.
The provisions of this Order shall also apply to the pending
case of H. G. Ellenburg against the same defendants.
June 8, 1948. J. ROBT. MARTIN, JR.,
Presiding Judge, 13th Judicial
Circuit, Hitchin, South Carolina
PRE-TRIAL TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. MITCHELL
Pursuant to the foregoing order the testimony of Thomas
J. Mitchell was taken before W. E. Findley, Special Referee,
and an alleged contract produced. The document produced is
the same one that was offered in evidence by the defendants
as the contract between Poinsett and Grant. Thomas J. Mit-
chell testified before the Special Referee as follows:
EXAMINATION BY MR. CURLING
Mr. Thomas J. Mitchell, being first duly sworn testified
as follows:
Q. Mr. Mitchell, are you the manager of Poinsett Lumber
and Manufacturing Company?
A. Yes, sir, "Works Manager."
Q. What do you mean by "Works Manager"?
A. That is the title which I hold.
Q. Do you appear here today as manager of Poinsett Lum-
ber and Manufacturing Company under order of Judge Mar-
tin dated June 8, 1948, made in the separate cases of Fields
Norris and H. G. Ellenburg against Poinsett Lumber and
Manufacturing Company and others?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you acting as manager of Poinsett Lumber and
Manufacturing Company on or about April 13, 1948?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. At the time Fields F. Norris and H. G. Ellenburg were
injured?
A. I was Works Manager at that time.
Q. Did you then have and do you now have supervision
over all the business affairs'and operations of Poinsett Lum-
ber and Manufacturing Company?
A. Repeat the question.
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Q. Did you then have and do you now have supervision
over all the business affairs and operations of Poinsett Lum-
ber and Manufacturing Company?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you have supervision over the plant at Hitchin at
the time of the injuries of Fields F. Norris and H. G. Ellen-
burg?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you have supervision over the timber lands at the
time of the injuries?
BY MR. HARMSWORTH:
We object to that question. Under the order of the Court
our friends have the right to examine Mr. Mitchell with ref-
erence to the contract and relation but we do not want to go
any further about the supervision of the timber lands in any
way. Mr. Mitchell had said that he has authority at the time
to act for Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing Company and
that is as far as we want to go.
BY MR. CURLING:
We are merely asking these questions for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not Mr. Mitchell knows about the
contracts and content thereof and unless he has supervision
over the timber he might not have known about the contracts.
BY MR. HARMSWORTH:
We have no objection if you will rephrase the question to
ask if Mr. Mitchell has responbility and personal knowledge
about the contracts relative to the timber lands.
BY MR. CURLING:
Q. As stated by Mr. Harmsworth, I understand you have
authority and responsibility to know about the contracts
relative to cutting, logging and hauling logs?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You understand that you have been required by order of
Judge Martin made in the cases dated June 8, 1948, to appear
here today to be examined under oath as to any contract or
contracts between Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing Com-
pany and the other defendants named in the amended com-
plaint in anywise relating to the logging and hauling opera-
tions growing out of which Fields F. Norris and H. G. Ellen-
burg were injured?
A. Repeat the question.
[Vol. II
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Q. You understand that you have been required by order
of Judge Martin made in the cases dated June 8, 1948, to
appear here today to be examined under oath as to any con-
tract or contracts between Poinsett Lumber and Manufactur-
ing Company and the other defendants named in the amended
complaint in anywise relating to the logging and hauling op-
erations growing out of which Fields F. Norris and H. G.
Ellenburg were injured?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that you have been required to pro-
duce and to give to the Referee at this hearing any contract
or contracts relating to such logging and hauling operations
in order that the plaintiff may have access to such contract
or contracts and the content and provisions thereof before
the trial of these suits and that the Referee is required to file
such contract when produced with the Clerk of Court.
BY MR. BRIGG:
The order requires that the contract be produced for in-
spection but not to file it with the Clerk of Court.
BY MR. CURLING:
The order clearly says that it is to be filed with the Clerk
of Court.
MR. CURLING READING FROM ORDER:
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Special Referee do
immediately upon the conclusion of said hearing make and
file with the Clerk of this Court his report of the testimony
taken and that he do file with said report the contract or con-
tracts herein ordered to be produced."
Q. Do you have the contract?
A. I have.
Q. Will you present it to the Referee?
A. I will.
A contract was presented to the Referee by Mr. Thomas J.
Mitchell. The Referee received the contract in evidence and
identified it as Exhibit "A". The contract so received and
identified being between Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing
Company, First Party, and S. C. Grant, Second Party, and
bearing date February 3, 1945, identified as logging contract
No. 41.
BY MR. BRIGG:
May it please the Court about the filing of the contract in
the Clerk's office, the order provides: "Further the Court is
11
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of the opinion that the defendant, Poinsett Lumber and Man-
ufacturing Company, and its manager, Thomas J. Mitchell,
should be compelled to immediately make such contract or
contracts as existed available to the plaintiff in order that
the plaintiff and the statutory subrogee may have a pre-trial
inspection and copy thereof, or that such defendant, and its
manager be required to file the contract or contracts with
the Clerk of Court of Hitchin County for such purpose." We
are presenting the contract and our friends have the right
to inspect and make a copy of it but we do not see the need
of filing it in the Clerk's office.
BY MR. CURLING:
On the trial of this case we may desire to present this
testimony and the contract to the Court and may desire to
offer the testimony and contract in evidence.
BY MR. BRIGG:
The paper is in evidence without filing it in the Clerk's
office.
BY MR. CURLING:
The order provides by its terms that it be filed with the
Clerk of Court.
BY THE REFEREE:
I will read the contract and order and act accordingly.
BY MR. CURLING:
Q. Mr. Mitchell, was the contract which you have presented
the only contract in existence between Poinsett Lumber and
Manufacturing Company and any of the defendants named
in this amendment complaint at the time of the injuries?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The only contract between Poinsett Lumber and Manu-
facturing Company and S. C. Grant?
A. The only one.
Q. Is this the only contract between Poinsett Lumber and
Manufacturing Company and Taft Chappell?
A. There was no contract with Chappell.
Q. Is this the only contract between Poinseit Lumber and
Manufacturing Company and Roy Bryant?
A. There was no contract with Bryant.
Q. Was there any other contract existing between Poin-
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Q. Mr. Mitchell was there at any time any additional or
supplemental contract between the defendant, S. C. Grant
and the defendant, Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing
Company?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was there ever any verbal or written changes or altera-
tions of the terms and provisions of the contract?
A. There was not.
Q. Mr. Mitchell, was there at any time any waiver or con-
sent upon the part of Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing
Company to waive or release any provision of this contract?
A. The contract stands.
Q. Mr. Mitchell, was there at any time any verbal contract
of any kind between Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing
Company and any of the defendants?
A. No, sir.
Q. No contract whatsoever except the one produced?
A. No, sir.
PETITION
Omitting the caption the following is plaintiff's verified
petition of May 28, 1948:
TO: THE HONORABLE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
HITCHIN COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA:
Your petitioner respectfully shows:
1. That he is the plaintiff in the above entitled action which
is now pending trial; that by answer in said action made
defendant, Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company, al-
leges that the truck and trailer in question were not under
its supervision, control or direction and that its co-defendant,
Taft Chappell, was an independent contractor engaged in the
logging business at the time mentioned and that Roy Bryant
was employed by him and under his sole and exclusive direc-
tion; that the petitioner is advised, the information having
been furnished to the attorney for petitioner by John Breare,
of the firm of Harmsworth and Harmsworth, attorneys for
defendant, Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company, that
Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company on the trial of
this case intends to rely, for purpose of defense, upon a con-
tract in writing in the possession of said defendant executed
between said defendant and the defendant, S. C. Grant, who
13
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is a brother-in-law of the defendant, Taft Chappell; that the
defendant, Taft Chappell, has told this petitioner that he hired
Roy Bryant, that his brother-in-law, S. C. Grant, hired him
and that Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company hired
Grant under a contract in writing, which said defendant has
seen, to log and haul the logs from timber lands owned by
Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company in the mountains
of Hitchin County to the sawmill of Poinsett Lumber & Man-
ufacturing Company at Hitchins; petitioner is further in-
formed by other persons similarly employed by Poinsett Lum-
ber & Manufacturing Company that this is the method of
operation used by said defendant in the operation of its large
holdings of timber land and its sawmill in Hitchin County;
that on the 18th day of July, 1947, the petitioner through his
attorney, Amigel Wade, made written demand upon Messrs.
Harmsworth & Harmsworth, Attorneys for Poinsett Lumber
& Manufacturing Company, for a copy of the contract or that
the contract be filed with the Clerk of Court of Hitchin
County in order that petitioner might procure a copy thereof;
that, upon information and belief, some several days there-
after Mr. William Brigg, an attorney and member or associate
of the law firm of Harmsworth & Harmsworth, advised the
attorney for petitioner by telephone that said law firm would
not deliver the contract to the attorney for petitioner, that
they would not allow the attorney for petitioner to inspect and
copy the same and would not file the same in the office of
the Clerk of Court of Hitchin County in order that the attor-
ney for petitioner might copy or inspect the same; that
thereafter on the 6th day of September, 1947, the said Wil-
liam Brigg, upon behalf of the law firm of Harmsworth &
Harmsworth, attorneys for defendants, served upon the at-
torney for petitioner a notice of a motion to be made before
the Resident or Presiding Judge of the 13th Judicial Circuit
at Gruenwald, South Carolina, on September 19, 1947; that
at the time of the service of said notice of motion, as peti-
tioner is informed and believes, petitioner's attorney again
made personal demand upon said William Brigg, attorney,
for a copy of the aforesaid contract; that he at said time
admitted the existence of such a contract and again refused
to make the same accessible in any manner to petitioner or
his attorney; that on the 11th day of September, 1947, the
petitioner made personal demand upon the said Thomas J.
[Vol. 11
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Mitchell to be allowed to inspect the aforesaid contract as to
the content thereof or to make a copy thereof or that the said
Thomas J. Mitchell file the same with the Clerk of Court of
Hitchin County in order that petitioner might inspect the
same or make a copy thereof; that the said Thomas J. Mitchell
denied the petitioner the right to in any manner secure knowl-
edge as to the content of the contract.
2. That petitioner is informed and believes that Messrs.
Harmsworth & Harmsworth, attorneys, have refused to an-
swer by letter the letter of the attorney for petitioner re-
questing a copy of the contract or inspection thereof.
3. That the plaintiff was not present at the scene of the
operation of the business of the defendant, Poinsett Lumber
& Manufacturing Company, in the cutting and logging of tim-
ber from said defendant's lands in the mountains of Hitchin
County, South Carolina, and was not present during the haul-
ing of said logs by truck to the sawmill of said defendant
near the Town of Hitchin, which operations resulted in plain-
tiff's injuries; that the content of any contract or arrange-
ment between Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Company
and the other named defendants for such logging and hauling
and the kind, amount and extent of the supervision, control
or direction as between said parties and of the right thereto
is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendants, Roy
Bryant, Taft Chappell, and S. C. Grant.
4. That for the reasons hereinabove set out the plaintiff
is entitled to an order of Court under the provisions of Sec-
tion 674 through 682 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina of
1942, to an examination of the said Roy Bryant, Taft Chap-
pell and S. C. Grant, as in said statute provided, concerning
the matter within the knowledge of the said Roy Bryant, Taft
Chappell and S. C. Grant as to the facts and circumstances
of their operation referred to in the amended complaint herein
and resulting in the injuries to the petitioner, and particularly
as to the facts and circumstances, terms and conditions of the
contract or arrangement between the defendants to this ac-
tion as to the logging and hauling of logs and growing out of
which operations the plaintiff was injured.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court order and
direct the said Roy Bryant, Taft Chappell and S. C. Grant
to appear in person before the Court or a Special Referee
to be appointed under the provisions of Section 677 Code of
15
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Laws of South Carolina of 1942, at the time and place desig-
nated in said order, to be examined as a witness hereinabove
set out as to the logging operations, the terms and conditions
thereof, which operations resulted in the injuries to the peti-
tioner, including the extent of the supervision, control and
direction of Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing Company
over said operations and as to its right to supervise, control




and Attorneys for the Statutory
Subrogee.
NOTICE
The following notice of motion was served with the above
petition:
TO: THE DEFENDANTS, ROY BRYANT, TAFT CHAP-
PELL AND S. C. GRANT, AND TO MESSRS.
HARMSWORTH & HARMSWORTH, ATTORNEYS
OF RECORD FOR THE NAMED DEFENDANTS
OTHER THAN S. C. GRANT:
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that based upon the
pleadings in this action and upon the attached petition and
affidavit, the undersigned, the attorneys for the plaintiff
and statutory subrogee in the above entitled action will move
before the Presiding Judge of the 13th Judicial Circuit in
open court or at chambers in the Hitchin County Court House
at 10:00 o'clock, A.M., on Monday, June 7, 1948, or as soon
thereafter as counsel may be heard, for an order requiring the
defendants, Roy Bryant, Taft Chappell and S. C. Grant, to
appear before the Court or a Special Referee appointed by
the Court under the provisions of Section 677 of the Code
of Laws of South Carolina of 1942, to be examined as a wit-
ness as to the contract and the content thereof referred to
in the attached petition and as to the facts and circumstances
surrounding the logging and hauling of logs from the lands
of the defendant, Poinsett Lumber and Manufacturing Com-
pany, in the mountains of Hitchin County, South Carolina,
to the sawmill of said defendant at Hitchin, South Carolina,
and as a result of which operations the injuries to the plain-
[Vol. 1i
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tiff-petitioner resulted. The plaintiff-petitioner will ask the
Court that the order specify particularly that the plaintiff-
petitioner be allowed to examine as a witness the defendants,
Roy Bryant, Taft Chappell and S. C. Grant, particularly as
to the content of any written or verbal contract or arrange-
ment relating to the cutting, logging and hauling of logs by
the other defendants from the lands of the defendant, Poin-
sett Lumber and Manufacturing Company, in the mountains of
Hitchin County, South Carolina, to its sawmill located near
the Town of Hitchin, and as to the control and right of con-
trol over the said operations exercised and retained by the






and Attorneys for the Statutory
Subrogee.
VERBAL ORDERS ON APPLICATION FOR PRE-TRIAL
EXAMINATIONS
Thereafter at hearings had after proper notice before
Judge Martin upon the two foregoing petitions and notice
of motions at Gruenwald on July 13, 1948, and on July 16,
1948, Judge Martin made the following verbal orders: That
as a matter of law plaintiff was entitled only to (1) the con-
tent of the alleged contract between Poinsett Lumber & Mfg.
Co. and Grant; (2) the content of the alleged contract or
verbal agreement between Grant and Chappell; and (3) to
know whether or not the defendant truck and trailer at the
time plaintiff was injured were operating under the terms
of such contracts and agreements. Judge Martin on July 16,
1948, by verbal order directed that the defendants, Grant and
Chappell, appear personally before him in open Court im-
mediately before the call of the case for trial to be there
before the trial personally examined only as to the content
of the contracts and agreements and as to whether or not the
truck and trailer at the time plaintiff was injured was op-
erating under the terms of the contracts or agreements.
17
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VERBAL ORDER OF JUDGE MARTIN AT COMMENCE-
MENT OF TRIAL
The following is the record of what transpired and the
verbal order of Judge Martin made just prior to the com-
mencement of the trial.
By Mr. Wade:
Your Honor, before we read the pleadings, there is a mat-
ter we wish to take up.
The Court:
All right, Mr. Bailiff, take the jury back to their room.
If they need anything, see that they get it.
(Jury retires).
By Mr. Harmsworth:
If the Court please, we object to going into this at this time.
The plaintiffs ask for information as to the contract betveen
the defendant Grant and the defendant Chappell. We, as
your Honor will recall, supplied an affidavit, which the at-
torneys for the plaintiffs objected to. The plaintiffs said they
have not been informed about it. It is Thursday and it is
reported to us the plaintiff has served twenty-five witnesses.
I don't see any point in further delaying the matter, perhaps
putting it in a situation where we can't finish this case be-
fore we go into a pre-trial examination. Your Honor, they
have had all the information they are entitled to. That is the
only thing they are entitled to and we suggest --
The Court:
Let the record show, Mr. Stenographer, that at an appro-
priate time, the plaintiff, thru counsel, made a motion before
this Court to examine two of the defendants under the Stat-
ute; that this Court at that time held that the plaintiffs
were entitled to certain information and would order the ex-
amination of the parties requested on two issues: first, as
to whether or not there existed a contract between - who
are they, Mr. Curling?
By Mr. Curling:
It would be between S. C. Grant and Taft Chappell.
The Court:
Between Grant and Chappell.
By Mr. Curling:
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By Mr. Curling:
There are two of them.
The Court:
As to whether there is a contract between Grant and Chap-
pell; as to whether such contract was oral or written and the
terms thereof. Second, as to whether the truck in question at
the time and on the occasion in question was being operated
under the terms of the alleged contract.
Counsel for the defendants and the plaintiff had a confer-
ence before this Court and it was suggested that the matter
might be facilitated by the presenting of a written statement
containing the above information that the Court had ruled
the plaintiff entitled to. Some days later, counsel re-appeared
before this Court, and plaintiff, thru his attorneys, object to
certain information or certain statements, rather, contained
in the statements of Grant and Chappell, at which time this
Court determined to allow an examination of the two parties
in open Court on these issues upon the call of the case. I am
limiting you strictly to those two issues as to those two wit-
nesses.
By Mr. Curling:
I have two questions for - -
The Court:
Very good. Call him around. You don't need any explana-
tion.
PRE-TRIAL TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT, S. C. GRANT
S. C. Grant, was then called to the stand, was sworn and
testified as follows:
MR. S. C. GRANT, (Pre-Trial Examination), being duly
sworn, testified as follows:
Direct Examination by Mr. Curling:
Q. Are you S. C. Grant?
A. That is right.
Q. You are one of the defendants in this action?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Grant, was there a contract or agreement between
you and Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Co. whereby you
were to cut timber on lands of --
By Mr. Brigg:
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By Mr. Curling:
Q. Poinsett Lumber Co. in Oconee County and haul the logs
to the pond of Poinsett Lumber Co. at Hitchin?
The Court:
Don't answer it now. Read it again.
By Mr. Brigg:
Your Honor - -
For goodness sake, let me see the question. Read it again.
By Mr. Curling:
Q. Was there a contract or agreement between you and
Poinsett Lumber Co. whereby you were to cut timber on lands
of Poinsett Lumber Co. on Wright's Creek in Oconee County
and haul the logs to Poinsett Lumber Co. at Hitchin?
The Court:
Just ask him if there was a contract. You are setting out
what you contend are the terms of it. Let him tell what the
terms are.
By Mr. Curling:
I just want to know if he had a contract.
The Court:
It is awful simple to ask him if he had a contract between
Poinsett Lumber Company - what is your objection?
By Mr. Brigg:
The written contract has already been introduced. Now, the
only issue here is the contract between Mr. Chappell and Mr.
Grant.
The Court:
That Is all he is entitled to.
By Mr. Curling:
Your Honor, as to the witness Grant, I believe I am entitled
to know whether or not he had a contract and whether he was
operating under It, and as to whether or not Chappell had a
contract or agreement, and if he was operating under it.
The Court:




That was not the purpose of this examination.
By Mr. Curling:
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The Court:
My understanding was it was whether or not this defendant
Grant had a contract as between he and Chappell.
By Mr. Curling:
Yes, sir, you know you asked me that question. I was in-
tending to tell you in addition we wanted to know those other
two. I have four questions to ask.
The Court:
I don't care if you have a hundred - the only two I have
allowed are the two I indicated - whether there is a contract
between this defendant and Chappell. If so, the terms of that
contract. If you want to ask him that I will allow it. That is
what I have ruled, that you have - -
By Mr. Curling:
I want to know two questions.
The Court:
I have ruled on it, Mr. Curling:
By Mr. Curling:
Mr. Grant, was there an agreement or contract between
you and Taft Chappell, the other defendant in this action,
for the hauling of logs from Wright's Creek in Jocassee to
the Poinsett plant at Hitchin?
A. We had a verbal contract.
The Court:
A little louder.
A. We had a verbal contract for $12.50 a thousand board
feet.
By Mr. Curling:
Q. All right, Mr. Grant, at that time, on February 13, 1945,
At the time the Plaintiff, Fields Norris, was injured, was the
truck described in the complaint engaged in hauling logs pur-
suant to such contract or verbal agreement - was it operat-




Very good. What is the other - -
I don't know that it would be necessary when one witness
testifies - I guess we had better examine Mr. Chappell.
237
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PRE-TRIAL TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT,
R. T. CHAPPELL
MR. TAFT CHAPPELL, being duly sworn, (Pre-trial ex-
amination), testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. CURLING:
Q. You are R. T. Chappell?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. A defendant in this action?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Chappell, did you have an agreement with Mr.
Grant for hauling those logs, a verbal agreement?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was the truck described in the complaint at the time
that Fields Norris was injured operating pursuant to that
contract?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That is all.
The Court:
Very good, all right, bring the jury.
(Jury Returns - Pleadings read).
PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE
The jury had been excluded from the court room during
the foregoing pre-trial examination of Grant and Chappell.
The jury were returned to the court room, were sworn and
the pleadings thereupon read. The pre-trial testimony of the
defendants, Grant and Chappell, shown hereinabove was
then read to the Court and jury by the Court Reporter. The
pre-trial testimony of Thomas J. Mitchell taken before the
Special Referee and shown herein under proceedings for pre-
trial examination was read to the jury. Only his testimony
was read showing that his company, the defendant, Poinsett,
had a contract with Grant to log and haul logs and that the
defendant truck and trailer were operating under the contract
when the plaintiff was injured. The alleged contract was not
in any way offered in evidence by the plaintiff and no objec-
tion was made thereto by defendants' counsel.
How to Preserve Questions for Review: Hubbard v. Rowe
(1939), 192 S. C. 12, 5 S. E. 2d 187, is one of the leading
cases as to how to preserve questions for review. It also laid
down the rule, which is different from some other jurisdic-
[Vol. 11
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tions, that in appealing from an error of law no motion for
a new trial is necessary, since the trial judge had made a final
ruling. As said at page 19:
In matters of appeal, so far as it appears, all that this
Court has ever required is that the questions presented
for its decision must first have been fairly and properly
raised in the lower Court and passed upon by that Court.
Of course, as to questions specifically affecting the ver-
dict, or other questions not specifically ruled on, the
Court below must of necessity be given an opportunity
on motion for a new trial of passing upon and correcting
such matters before they can or will be reviewed by
this Court on appeal. The decided cases relied on by
the respondent go no further than that.
In Detheridge v. Earle, 3 S. C., 396, cited by appellant,
syllabus 2, which correctly states the holding of the
Court, reads as follows: "For error of law, a new trial
may be granted on appeal from the judgment, though
no motion for a new trial was made before the Circuit
Judge."
In Brice v. Hamilton, 12 S. C., 32, decided in 1879,
where a similar question was considered, the Court said:
"A general objection is made by the defendants to the
effect that no application was made to the Circuit judge
for a new trial, but the appeal is directly from the judg-
ment, and, therefore, as they contend, the exceptions
taken at the trial cannot be heard. There is no ground
for such an objection. It was competent for the plaintiffs
to have moved before the Circuit Court for a new trial,
but as the objections to the verdict relate to matters of
law alone, and could be heard in this court, the appellants
were not bound to submit them to the Circuit judge, on
a motion for a new trial, before appealing to this court.
There is no provision of the code exacting any such con-
dition to an appeal to this court, and no antecedent prac-
tice from which such a rule could be inferred. An appeal
from a judgment involves any intermediate order in-
volving the merits and necessarily affecting the judg-
ment (Code, §11), and this includes all rulings and
charges material to the judgment."
It may be noted that the above decision should also be care-
fully read by an attorney starting trial practice in this State
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as it bears upon various phases of conduct concerning which
every trial attorney should know.
In some jurisdictions, if there is a ruling against one during
a trial, he must note an "exception" to same there and then
so that it will appear on the trial record otherwise one may
lose his right to move for a new trial or to appeal from such
ruling. This is not the rule in South Carolina. All that is
necessary in this State is to have the trial record show a final
ruling. Then one may move before the trial judge for a new
trial on that ground or, if it is a ruling on a matter of law,
one may go directly to the Supreme Court on a proper excep-
tion to such final ruling. It should be noted at this point that
the word "exception" is now used in this State only in appeal-
ing. It should no longer be used in the court below. Although
Section 10-1462 refers to "A motion for a new trial on a case
or exceptions .... , " the practice has been for sometime now
to use the word "grounds" in place of "exceptions" in the trial
court when making a motion for a new trial thus keeping the
latter word only for use in appealing from a lower to a higher
court. In that way confusion is avoided. Hence one finds in
Hubbard v. Rowe, supra, that the Supreme Court would not
consider a certain question because there was no "exception"
in the appellate record bringing up such question before it.
As said at page 24 of that decision:
The contention of Hubbard that the trial judge erred
in holding that the relationship of master and servant
did not exist between him and the company, cannot be
considered by this Court for the reason that that ques-
tion is not properly before us, there being no exception
taken to such ruling of the Court below.
Briefs:
1. Follow the Supreme Court Rules, as amended to date.
2. TITLE page on front, identical with that for "Transcript
of Record" through the name of the last party in the
cause. From there on, it will contain either "BRIEF
OF APPELLANT" or "BRIEF OF RESPONDENT"
or "BRIEF OF AMICUS (or AMICI) CURIAE", or
"REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT", in each instance
with the names of the attorneys presenting the particular
BRIEF placed underneath and last, and somewhat to the
right of the center of the page.
[Vol. II
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3. INDEX of contents, inside of front page. (This page not
be numbered.)
4. INDEX to cases or Table of cases, statutes, and consti-
tutional provisions cited or discussed, or better still,
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, on front of page facing
that with "INDEX". The back or reverse side of this
page should be blank. (These pages must not be num-
bered.)
5. QUESTIONS PRESENTED should be numerically listed
on front of first page. If they go over onto the reverse
side of that page, do not begin anything else on that
reverse side. (Page with "QUESTIONS" is the first to
be numbered.)
6. STATEMENT should be next; this statement should be
an enlargement of the STATEMENT contained in the
"Transcript of Record" or "RETURN", and should con-
tain concisely stated the salient facts supportin. the
side of the case which the BRIEF represents. When
referring to the facts always locate by stating folio num-
bers where the court may find them in the Transcript of
Record, thus (f. 18) or (ff. 18-20).
Note that the Transcript of Record, as required by Rule 5,
has folio numbers on the side, each number including approxi-
mately 100 words. These folios are necessary for use in the
Briefs, or in oral argument, to call to the attention of the
Court and the other side where certain facts are located; not
only on which page, but exactly on what part of such page.
Hence the folios are absolutely necessary. Usually the average
printer knows how to use them but the attorney should al-
ways check on it, as he should on everything else going be-
fore the Supreme Court.
7. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES (or in lieu of that:
ARGUMENT).
8. Divisions of the above in No. 7 should be as follows:
(Corresponding to the numerical order of the questions
as stated under No. 5 supra.)
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QUESTION
ENJOINING A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
(The following is a repetition of the question as stated
under No. 5 and should be ITALICISED) :
Can a court of equity enjoin officers of the State Highway
Department from prosecuting persons for violation of a crimi-
nal law with respect to payment of a license fee or revenue
tax, when it is contended the law is unconstitutional and
void? (Exceptions 4 and 5.)
9. Then comes argument on the above point or question.
After that will come the next QUESTION, the division
treating it being numbered with the Roman numeral as
follows:
II
(Note: that plenty of space should be left between the
divisions treating each question. One (1) inch
should do.)
10. The Respondent at the end of his BRIEF should have a
division entitled REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF
(in this type). This should treat the questions argued
by the Appellant in the same order as they appear in
the Appellant's Brief. However, in some instances it may
be wise, depending on the subject, not to separate the
reply but to put all argument on any one point in re-
spondents' main Brief, thus avoiding undue repetition.
11. Every Brief should be concluded under the title "CON-
CLUSION". The conclusion should not contain more
than 100 to 150 words, summarizing very briefly the
points made and concluding with the thought that the
judgment below should not stand, as the case may be.
12. All Briefs should be "Respectfully submitted," with the
names of respective attorneys appearing thereunder;
and under their names whether they are "Attorneys for
Respondent" or "Attorneys for Appellant."
Specimen of Part of Brief: For the case involving these
questions, see Stovall v. Sawyer, Chief Hwy. Comm'r. (1936),
181 S. C. 379, 187 S. E. 821.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Can a court of equity enjoin officers of the State High-
way Department from prosecuting persons for violation
Vol. 11
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of a criminal law with respect to payment of a license fee
or revenue tax, when it is contended the law is uncon-
stitutional and void? (Exceptions 4 and 5).
2. (a) Is the first sentence of Section 5899 unconstitutional
and void as being an unlawful delegation of legislative
authority?
(b) If it is, then is not the regulation of the State High-
way Department, passed pursuant thereto, also void as
unlawful exercise of legislative authority?
(c) If the first sentence of that section is not void, then
is not the regulation void as exceeding the authority-
granted by the section?
3. If the first sentence of Section 5899 is unconstitutional
and void, does that render the entire section or all of
Sections 5896-5900 unconstitutional and void?
4. Is the last sentence of Section 5897 a condition precedent
to bringing suit so that non-compliance with the pro-
visions thereof would bar respondents from maintaining
their suit?
STATEMENT
This action was brought by the respondent to enjoin the ap-
pellants from arresting or interfering with the respondents
in the operation of their automobiles upon the highways of
the State of South Carolina, and also to enjoin the appellants
from enforcing or attempting to enforce the regulation of
the State Highway Department defining the term "non-
resident."
The respondents, Louis Stovall and E. B. Collins, are bank
examiners, and the respondent, C. H. Lambertson, is a tabu-
lating accountant. They are employees of the United States-
under the supervision and control of the Farm Credit Admin-
istration at Washington, D. C., having their cars in this State
solely for pleasure and convenience. They are residents of'
other States, owning automobiles duly licensed therein. In
the performance of their official duties, they travel in and
through many States, often remaining in no one State more.
than several days or a few weeks at a time, and seldom stay-
ing in oue State for a total of ninety days in any one year.
They had not at the time of their arrest or threatened arrest
been in the State of South Carolina for a period of ninety
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days nor had any of their respective cars been regularly or
periodically used in this State for busines or commercial pur-
poses. (ff. 2-8; f. 22; ff. 40-59.)
Two of the respondents, Louis Stovall and C. H. Lambert-
son, came into the State on September 2, 1935. They were
arrested on September 17, 1935, by patrolmen of the State
Highway Department on the charge of unlawfully operating
their cars on September 11, 1935, upon the State Highways
without obtaining South Carolina, 1935, license plates. On
September 18, 1935, they were tried and their cases dismissed
by the Magistrate. They, and others similarly situated includ-
ing the respondent, Collins, were immediately threatened with
arrest on the identical charge. (ff. 17-24.) That there was
thereafter such immediate threat of arrest was found by his
Honor, Judge Bellinger, to be a fact. (f. 101.)
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES (or ARGUMENT)
I
ENJOINING A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Can a court of equity enjoin officers of the State Highway
Department from prosecuting persons for violation of a crimi-
nal law with respect to payment of a license fee or revenue
tax, when it is contended the law is unconstitutional and void?
(Exceptions 4 and 5.)
Argument as to questions 2, 3, and 4, which will come next,
each question being dealt with under the proper Roman nu-
meral placed in the middle of the page. After them will come
the conclusion as next outlined.
CONCLUSION
His Honor, Judge Bellinger, properly held that a court of
equity acquired jurisdiction of the cause. The first sentence
-of Section 5899 is invalid as an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority and the regulation of the State High-
way Department, defining the term "non-resident", is void
as an unlawful exercise of such authority. The first sentence
of Section 5899 can be declared invalid without affecting the
remainder of that Section or without affecting Sections 5896-
5900. The last sentence of Section 5897 does not create a
condition precedent and, if it did, the respondents, Louis Sto-
vall and C. H. Lambertson, have fully complied with the con-
[Vol. Ii
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dition. The injunction as granted should stand, restraining
the appellants from enforcing or attempting to enforce the
regulation of the State Highway Department.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorneys for Respondents-
Exceptions: South Carolina carries a case up for review
on exceptions which are contained in the last main subdivision
of the Transcript of Record. When the legislature abolished
the old writ of error, this state did away with the incidents
necessary to its use, among which was assignment of error
for review. However, Section 6 of Supreme Court Rule 4
tells us that each exception **must contain within itself a com-
plete assignment of error." So, the old common law is still
used to the extent of aiding in framing the statutory "excep-
tion." Again it should be recalled that the Rule also warns
one that "each exception must contain a concise statement
of one proposition of law or fact"; also that the proposition
must be distinctly and specifically stated.
Each exception must be concise, definite, neither long or
argumentative in form, and must contain only one assignment
of error. Supreme Court Rule 4, Section 6. If this Rule is
not conformed to, the reviewing court will not consider the
exception, unless it waives the attorney's failure, which in
its discretion it can do but seldom does, except in rare cases
such as those involving a life or death sentence.
As pointed out in Scott v. Independent Life and Acc. Ins.
Co. (1955), 227 S. C. 535, 88 S. E. 2d 623, at page 537:
The sole exception on this appeal is as follows: "His
Honor erred, it is respectfully submitted, in holding that
a cause of action has been stated in the complaint."
The foregoing exception is entirely too general, vague,
and indefinite to be considered. Rule 4, Section 6 of this
Court; Dendy v. Waite, 36 S. C. 569, 15 S. E. 712; Swy-
gert v. Wingard, 48 S. C. 321, 26 S. E. 653; Brady v.
Brady, 222 S. C. 242, 72 S. E. (2d) 193, 194. The last
mentioned case involved an appeal from a judgment sus-
taining an oral demurrer. The only exception was couched
in the following language: "'That his Honor, the trial
judge, erred in sustaining the oral demurrer to the com-
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plaint upon the ground that the complaint did not state
a cause of action, the error being that the complaint does
state a cause of action.'" The Court held that it was too
indefinite and did not comply with Rule 4, Section 6.
In the Brady case we waived the breach of the rule
and considered the exception because it was found to
embrace a meritorious assignment of error. In some in-
stances, however, we have absolutely refused to consider
exceptions framed in violation of the rule. [Cases cited.]
See also State v. Hollman (1958), 232 S. C. 489, 102 S. E.
2d 873.
Only matters that have been ruled on below can be re-
viewed, otherwise the appellate court would be exercising
original jurisdiction, and hence would not be a reviewing
court at all. In other words, the judge below must have been
"put in the wrong." As said in Elliott v. Page (1914), 98
S. C. 400, 82 S. E. 2d, at page 402:
.. . In the first place, his Honor, the Circuit Judge,
was not requested to rule upon the question, and as he
made no ruling upon it, it is not properly before this
Court of consideration. ....
See also Waltz v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of
U. S. (1958), ____ S. C. ,104 S. E. 2d 384, 391.
The theory must be the same in both trial and reviewing
courts, otherwise the two courts would be passing on different
questions. The rule is briefly stated in Wilson v. So. Ry. Co.
(1923), 123 S. C. 399, 115 S. E. 764, at page 405:
The only exception which imputes error to the trial
Court in refusing the motion for a new trial (6 and 7)
are very properly predicated upon and confined to the
grounds of that motion as made in the Circuit Court.
[Cases cited.]
And at page 408 one finds:
... To that portion of the Judge's charge so announc-
ing and applying the legal measure of defendant's lia-
bility, there was no exception taken either upon the mo-
tion for a new trial in the Court below or upon the appeal
to this Court. Indeed, the case seems to have been tried
by both parties without objection upon the theory that
the whole of the land claimed by the plaintiff had been
appropriated by defendants for railroad purposes, and
[Vol. 11
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that, if such appropriation was in excess of the rights ac-
quired by the railroad under the original entry, the plain-
tiff was entitled to an award of permanent damages.
The appellant's exceptions must therefore be considered
in the light of the general rule that the theory pursued
in the trial Court with respect "to the relief sought and
grounds therefor" must be adhered to in the appellate
Court. 3 C. J., pp. 730, 737, §§ 625, 630.
It should be noted in passing that the rule stated in the first
syllabus of the Wilson case, supra, is now no longer the law
because of the change made by Code Section 7-5 which now
allows an appeal from a verdict, even though no judgment has
been entered.
In framing one's exceptions for appeal one cannot be too
careful. This is illustrated by Planters Fertilizer etc. Co. v.
McCreight (1938), 187 S. C. 483, 198 S. E. 405. At page 488
one finds:
This appeal is from the two orders above mentioned.
The exceptions for appeal are:
"1. The trial Judge erred in striking out the following
from the first paragraph of the third defense in the an-
swer of the defendant: 'And the sum of $2500.00 paid by
defendent to plaintiff by his said promissory note and
chattel mortgage, which the plaintiff accepted and agreed
to credit on the said account of the defendant, aggregat-
ing * * *.'
"Specification: The said allegations so stricken from
the answer of the defendant state a valid partial defense
by way of payment and was, therefore, not irrelevant.
"2. The trial judge erred in granting the order to ex-
amine the defendant before trial.
It will be observed that the first exception without the
"specification" would be too general. It would violate
that part of Section 6, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court, which provides: "Each exception must contain a
concise statement of one proposition of law or fact which
this Court is asked to review. * * *" In numerous cases
this Court has declined to consider such exceptions. Ap-
pellant has elected to rely upon a single specification of
error in respect to the stricken allegations. That speci-
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fication of error in respect to the stricken allegations.
That specification assigns error on the part of the Cir-
cuit Judge for the reason that the allegations so stricken
"state a valid partial defense by way of payment and was,
therefore, not irrelevant." We might agree with appellant
with respect to this specification, but that would be of no
avail to him. The motion to strike was made upon the
ground that said allegations were "sham, frivolous and/or
irrelevant." There is a wide difference in the legal defi-
nition or meaning of these terms. We have no way of
knowing whether the Circuit Judge granted the motion
because he found that said allegations were sham or be-
cause he found them to be frivolous or irrelevant. In ap-
pellant's brief we find this: "The Trial Judge did not
make any findings of fact or conclusions of law other
than the very general conclusion that the particular por-
tion of the third defense in the answer should be stricken.
Counsel and parties are left in the dark as to the findings
of fact and conclusions of law upon which the order is
predicated."
It will be seen, therefore, that, although we might agree
with appellant as to his single "specification" we would
not be warranted in reversing the order appealed from.
The Court will sometimes relax its rules in order that
a litigant may not through inadvertence suffer ma-
terial loss, but such a situation cannot arise in this
case. Respondent contends that the note and mort-
gage were given merely as security for that much of
appellant's obligation under the contract. Appellant con-
tends that they were given in part payment of said obli-
gation and accepted as such. He admits, however, that
the mortgage debt is still unpaid. Taking either view of
the transaction appellant's liability growing out of his
contractual relations with respondent would remain the
same. His indebtedness to respondent has neither been
increased nor diminished.
See also Riddle v. George (1936), 181 S. C. 360, 187
S. E. 524, as to when the Court will waive compliance
with its Rules.
When Circuit Court Rule 76 Must be Used: If there was a
legal insufficiency of evidence, i.e., no scintilla or reasonable
inference to carry a case to the jury, one must be careful in
[Vol. II
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South Carolina to make a motion for a nonsuit or directed
verdict under Circuit Court Rule 76, else there can be no
appeal on that point, just like we have already ascertained
that there could be no chance of obtaining a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, though, but for such omission, one
might readily have obtained such a judgment. Hence, we
gather as we go along that an attorney through ignorance,
oversight, or plain carelessness can lose a client's cause any-
where along the line, all of which crystalizes before one a rule
of conduct: study thoroughly for each cause; do not overlook
that which is necessary and be careful at every step along the
procedural path. The pitfalls are many; so are the "musts";
the "maybe's" are few and far between.
Necessity of Motion for a New Trial: In some jurisdictions,
a motion for a new trial is a condition precedent to appealing.
That is true even as to matters definitely ruled on by the
judge during the trial process. This inconsistently gave him
"two bites at the cherry", and caused additional waste of
time and expense. South Carolina has a more consistent and
practical rule heretofore noted in Hubbard v. Rowe (1939),
192 S. C. 12, 5 S. E. 2d 187. One doesn't have to move for a
new trial as to matters definitely ruled on by the judge dur-
ing the trial. However, as to matters that only could be ruled
on by him after the trial, such as whether upon learning after
verdict rendered a juror improperly viewed the place of the
collision prior to a rendition of the verdict, or was taken to
dinner by an attorney in the cause, or whether a new trial
should be granted on after-discovered evidence, a motion for a
new trial is necessary, since then is the first chance the court
below will have had to make a ruling on any such matters,
and until there is such final ruling below there is no right of
review.
Appeal in Equity Cases: Where cases are referred to the
Master, exceptions must be taken to the Master's report, other-
wise, if questions as to errors are later raised, they will not
be considered on appeal. As said in Wise v. Picow et al.
(1958), 232 S. C. 237, 101 S. E. 2d 651, at page 244:
The defendants also complain that the Court was in
error in allowing interest from February 1, 1954, the
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A review of the record shows that the defendants did
not raise this question before the Master nor was there
any exception to the Master's Report when he recom-
mended that the sum found by him to be due plaintiff
bear interest from the date of the termination of the
contract.
We have held in numerous cases that it is not proper
to consider questions which were not raised in exceptions
to the Master's Report. [Cases cited.]
The power of the Supreme Court in equity cases as to pass-
ing on the facts is very different from that in law cases, ex-
cept where a jury verdict appears on the equity scene. As
Justice Taylor pointed out in Dobson v. Atkinson (1957), 232
S. C. 12, 100 S. E. 2d 531, at page 16:
This Court has jurisdiction in appeals in equity to find
the facts in accord with our view of the preponderance
or greater weight of the evidence, in the absence of ver-
dict by jury. Gilbert v. MeLeod Infirmary, 219 S. C. 174,
64 S. E. (2d) 524, 24 A. L. R. (2d) 60; Wise v. Wise,
60 S. C. 426, 38 S. E. 794; Forester v. Forester, 226 S. C.
311, 85 S. E. (2d) 187; and an action for divorce is with-
in the equity jurisdiction of the Court. Accordingly the
evidence must be considered in the light of the well set-
tled rule that in an equity case findings of fact by a
Master or Referee, concurred in by the Court, will not
be disturbed by this Court on appeal unless it appears
that such findings are without evidentiary support or
against the clear preponderance of the evidence. Archim-
bault v. Sprouse, 218 S. C. 500, 63 S. E. (2d) 459; Mincey
v. Mincey, 224 S. C. 520, 80 S. E. (2d) 123, 126; Oswald
v. Oswald, 230 S. C. 299, 95 S. E. (2d) 493.
See also Simonds v. Simonds (1957), 232 S. C. 185, 101
S. E. 2d 494.
By comparison, in an action at law, even where the case is
tried by a judge without a jury, his findings have the same
force and effect as a verdict of a jury, and unless he has
committed some error of law or the evidence is reasonably sus-
ceptible of only the opposite conclusion, his findings must be
accepted by the Supreme Court. Robinson v. Carolina Cas-
ualty Ins. Co. (1958), 232 S. C. 268, 101 S. E. 2d 664.
[Vol. Ii
34
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 5 [1959], Art. 24
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss5/24
1959] HANDBOOK OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE 251
Reviewing and Appealing Workmen's Compensation Cases:
There is no doubt now what the necessary procedure must
be as to reviewing and appealing such cases. As pointed out
by Justice Legge in Wall v. C. Y. Thomason Co. et. al. (1957),
232 S. C. 153, 101 S. E. 2d 286, at page 155:
Procedure for review by the full Commission of the
award of the hearing commissioner is prescribed by Sec-
tion 72-355 of the 1952 Code, and for appeal to the court
of common pleas from the award of the full Commission
by Section 72-356. If no application is made for review
of the hearing commissioner's award, that award be-
comes effective as the award of the Commissioner. Me-
Donald v. Palmetto Theaters, 196 S. C. 38, 11 S. E. (2d)
444.
Section 72-357 provides that upon the filing in the court
of common pleas of a certified copy of an award un-
appealed from the court "shall render judgment in ac-
cordance therewith." The language of the section is man-
datory; and the rendition of judgment in such case is
ministerial rather than judicial, for the award is subject
to review only by the appeal procedure to which we have
referred.
Appeal to the court of common pleas from the Commis-
sion's award is governed by the same principles that
apply in ordinary civil actions, Code, Section 72-356, and
that court can consider only matters that were before
the Commission and as to which error has been spe-
cifically assigned. Jones v. Anderson Cotton Mills, 205
S. C. 247, 31 S. E. (2d) 447; Bush v. Gingrey Brothers,
S. C., 100 S. E. (2d) 821.
Constitutional and Jurisdictional Questions: As to a con-
stitutional question, it must be raised below, when possible,
i.e., at the "earliest opportunity," else there is waiver. Salley
v. McCoy, 186 S. C. 1, 195 S. E. 132. This, of course, doesn't
apply to jurisdiction of the subject matter. The latter can
be raised at any time, even for the first time in the appellate
court. As to the question of jurisdiction the Supreme Court
may raise the point itself. Henderson v. Wyatt (1876), 8
S. C. 112. Where a contract is against good morals, or where
there is an agreement to stifle a prosecution, Wight v. Rind-
skopt, 43 Wis. 344, it is even the duty of the judge of his own
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motion, if necessary, to dismiss the cause. South Carolina
would probably adopt a similar rule.
Some years ago the writer was sitting in a South Carolina
courtroom. The plaintiff's attorney had just finished reading
the complaint to the jury, when Judge Watts asked the attor-
ney if the suit was by a prostitute claiming that the defendant
had given her a venereal disease. The attorney said: "Yes,
Your Honor." Judge Watts immediately turned to the Clerk
and said: "Mr. Clerk, this case is dismissed. Courts don't hear
such matters. Call the next case."
In this State Sec. 10-547 providing that there shall be no
waiver of the objection that no cause of action is stated by
a failure to demur applies only to the trial court. The objec-
tion can't be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court.
Montgomery v. Robinson (1912), 93 S. C. 247, 76 S. E. 188.
As declared by the Court at page 251:
Section 169 [now 10-647] of the Code of Procedure
provides that, if the objections to a complaint which are
mentioned in section 165 as grounds of demurrer, when
they appear upon the face of the complaint, are not
raised either by demurrer, or answer, when they do not
appear upon the face of the complaint, "the defendant
shall be deemed to have waived the same, excepting only
the objection to the jurisdiction of the Court, and the
objection that the complaint does not state facts suffi-
cient to constitute a cause of action." It follows that
the two objections excepted are not waived by the failure
to raise them by demurrer on answer; but it does not
follow that they cannot be waived at all. Some of the
cases, construing this section, hold that these objections
can be raised at any time and at any stage of the pre-
ceedings. While this statement is true, in a way, it is
somewhat misleading; for instance, it has been held that
the objection for insufficiency cannot be raised for the
first time in this Court. Therefore, it is waived by a
failure to raise it in the Circuit Court. Miller v. Hughes,
33 S. C. 526, 12 S. E. 419; Green v. Green, 50 S. C. 529,
27 S. E. 952. And it is quite certain that, once it has
been properly raised and decided, it cannot be raised
again.
However, this State would doubtless follow the rule adopted
elsewhere as to necessary or indispensable parties. Where
[Vol. II
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one of them is omitted, a judgment obtained would be non-
operative and therefore ineffectual. Such a question can be
raised for the first time in the appellate court. Shearer v.
Murphy, (Kan.) 66 Pac. 240.
Time for Obtaining Review: In South Carolina, the statutes
limiting the time for appealing are jurisdictional and manda-
tory. The 10 day period provided by See. 7-405 can't be
extended by the courts. Stroup v. Duke Power Co. (1949),
216 S. C. 79, 56 S. E. (2d) 745. That case at page 84 laid down
the rule as follows:
We agree with respondent that the Court of Common
Pleas rose not later than March 19th and that notice of
intention to appeal served twelve days thereafter was
not within time. In reaching this conclusion, we have
not overlooked the rule that statutes should be construed
liberally in favor of the right of appeal but "there is a
limit beyond which the most liberal construction cannot
go." Haughton v. Order of United Commercial Travelers
of America, 108 S. C. 73, 93 S. E. 393, 394. The time
prescribed by statute within which notice of appeal must
be given cannot be enlarged or extended by the courts.
Palmer v. Simons, 107 S. C. 93, 92 S. E. 23, and cases
cited.
The 10 day period can, of course, be extended by agreement
but an attorney should not enter into such an agreement with-
out first consulting his client. Since such time period is man-
datory, it behooves an attorney not to put off until the last
day serving the required notice, since he may become ill or
some other emergency may prevent compliance.
Another error in the Code annotations should be noted here.
The old case of Bank v. Gary (1881), 14 S. C. 571, is cited
under Section 7-405 as showing that such notice "need not be
in writing." Sec. 7-4 says it must be in writing. This section
governs.
It is probable that South Carolina would follow the rule
adopted by several other jurisdictions that where delay is
due to the court or to fraud of the adversary, a court has
inherent power to relieve an appellant from the strict time
limit. See Smythe v. Boswell, (Ind.) 20 N. E. 263 and
Schmuck v. Missouri, etc. Ry. Co., (Kan.) 116 Pac. 818.
What Effects Transfer of Jurisdiction: Where usable, a
writ of error is not considered brought until it is filed in the
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court which rendered judgment. This doesn't apply in South
Carolina because as heretofore noted the writ has been abol-
ished in this State.
Appeal, Need for Properly Perfecting: In South Carolina
an appeal to the Supreme Court has not been "brought" until
it has been "perfected and Docketed" with the Clerk of that
Court. Supreme Court Rules 1 and 18. This means that until
those two rules have been complied with the lower court re-
tains jurisdiction, except that under Rule 18 the Supreme
Court shall have jurisdiction only for granting a stay of pro-
ceedings when a certified copy of the notice of appeal with
proof of service thereof is filed with the Clerk of that Court.
As pointed out by Justice Stukes in State v. Cottingham
et al. (1953), 224 S. C. 181, 77 S. E. 2d 897, at page 186:
The necessity for punctual and orderly perfection of
appeals has been pointed out, and the requirement en-
forced, in many late cases. [Cases cited.] The following
concisely stated conclusion, applicable here, is taken from
the last cited decision, 202 S. C. at page 316, 24 S. E.
(2d) at page 518: "There is no dispute that the Tran-
script of Record was not served upon respondent and
filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court within the
time required by the rules. Nor did appellant undertake
to apply to a Court of competent jurisdiction for addi.
tional time in which to perfect his appeal. Therefore,
the motion of respondent to dismiss the appeal is
granted."
Justice Stukes at page 185 calls attention to the fact that
now only "Four days' notice of motion" to dismiss is necessary
and not "ten days' notice"; and also on that same page he
gives the following rule as to the respective powers of the trial
court and the Supreme Court to dismiss an appeal for failure
to abide by Supreme Court Rule 1:
"Since the jurisdiction proper of this court, to the ex-
clusion of the circuit court, does not attach until the
filing of the 'return,' before an appeal is perfected as
required by section 384, Code of Civ. Procedure (1912),
it is within the power of the circuit court to dismiss an
appeal by determining and declaring that the appeal to
this court has been abandoned, or the right of appeal
waived, by failure to take the steps required by law to
[Vol. 11
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perfect such appeal. [Cases cited.] No return having
then been filed in this Court, Judge Townsend clearly had
jurisdiction to hear and determine defendant's motion to
dismiss plaintiff's unperfected appeal."
In using Circuit Court Rule 49, care must be taken to com-
pare it with the Supreme Court Rules and wherever there
is the least inconsistency, the latter Rules govern. In fact,
except for how a case for appeal is to be settled by the Circuit
Judge, this Rule is seldom, if ever, used. When it does come
into the picture, it also applies now to a County Court Judge.
Sections 15-615 and 15-616. Sections of like import will be
found in the special chapters of the Code pertaining to spe-
cific county courts.
Appeals from County Courts: Sections 7-341 to 7-344, which
give the right of appeal from a county court to the Circuit
Court, should not be followed without first referring to the
particular county court Articles in the Code of 1952, begin-
ning with that on page 556 of Volume 2.
The above sections are part of a General Act and govern
only where a county court Act fails to provide for appeals.
Thus far, every such Act has provided for appealing directly
to the Supreme Court, as one will find, for example, in Sec-
tions 15-678, 15-699.17, 15-742, 15-779, and 15-830. In non-
support cases tried in the Marlboro County Court one "may"
appeal to the "court of common pleas of the county". Section
15-699.18.
As to the procedure on appeal from such courts, it is the
same as that from Circuit Courts, which will hereinafter be
discussed.
There are no applicable rules of court for these tribunals.
Sections 7-301 to 316 govern. Section 7-302 provides a time
period for appealing of five days. This period is mandatory.
If appeal is from a magistrate's court, the magistrate must
be served personally, or his clerk, if there is one, must be
so served. This is also mandatory. Section 7-304. If the
notice of appeal can not be served in either of the above ways,
it may be served by leaving it with the Clerk of the Appellate
Court. It has to be in writing, and service may be by mail.
Section 7-4.
The legislature has no power to take entirely away from
the Circuit Court the right and duty to hear such appeals.
255
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At most, it can only give County Courts concurrent jurisdic-
tions. Strickland v. S. A. L. RV. (1918), 112 S. C. 67, 98 S. E.
853. At page 68, it is stated:
The question for decision in this case is whether the
provision of section 3 of the act creating a County Court
for Richland county (30 Stat. 156), which confers upon
that Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine
appeals in all civil cases from magistrates' Courts, is
constitutional.
The provisions of the Constitution bearing upon the
question are found in sections 1, 15, and 23 of arti-
cle V...
Section 15 confers upon the Court of Common Pleas
jurisdiction in all civil cases, and appellate jurisdiction
in all cases within the jurisdiction of magistrates' Courts,
since they are inferior Courts from which appeals are
not allowed directly to the Supreme Court. Where the
Constitution confers jurisdiction upon a Court, the legis-
lature cannot take it away. Therefore, the legislature
cannot deprive the Court of Common Pleas of jurisdiction
in any civil case, nor of appellate jurisdiction in cases
within the jurisdiction of magistrates' Courts except by
providing for a direct appeal from these Courts to the
Supreme Court. But the power conferred upon the legis-
lature (by section 1) to establish County Courts, and
other Courts inferior to Circuit Courts, carried with it,
by necessary implication, the power to invest such Courts
with jurisdiction, which necessarily must be of cases
within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, since they
had already been invested with jurisdiction in all civil
and criminal cases, and the exception of certain cases
implies power to confer upon them jurisdiction in such
others as the legislature may determine. But the power
so implied must be exerted so as to avoid conflict with
the express provisions of the Constitution. This may be
done by conferring upon such inferior Courts concurrent
jurisdiction with that vested in the Court of Common
Pleas, since that does not deprive the latter of the juris-
diction vested in it by the Constitution. In conformity
with this principle, the legislature made the original
jurisdiction of the County Court concurrent with that
of the Court of Common Pleas; but, in violation of it
256 [Vol. 11
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and of the express provision of the Constitution, it at-
tempted to give the County Court exclusive jurisdiction
of appeals from the Court of magistrates.
As the legislature clearly had the power to give the
County Court concurrent jurisdiction of such appeals,
and as the greater includes the less, so much of the act
as gives the County Court jurisdiction of such appeals
is valid, and only so much of it is void as attempts to
make that jurisdiction exclusive. It follows that the
County Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court
of Common Pleas to hear such appeals.
A magistrate must make a "return" to the reviewing court.
If he declines to do so, he can be mandamused, for without
that "return" there would be nothing for the reviewing court
to hear.
So that all the pertinent facts will go up for review, thereby
allowing the reviewing court to pass on the case as heard
below, the magistrate is under a duty to take down in writ-
ing the testimony. Section 7-313. Of course, he is not ex-
pected to take it down verbatim like a stenographer, but he
must at least take down all important facts in condensed form.
If he should not be doing so, one of the attorneys should cour-
teously call the omission to his attention, else there would
be waiver, and there would be no case for appeal, or, at most,
one that would not be the same as that actually tried. City of
Greenville v. Latimer (1907), 80 S. C. 92, 61 S. E. 224, gives
the rule at page 93:
* * " A jury need not be summoned unless the defend-
ant demands it, but the taking of the testimony as re-
quired is a duty devolving upon the magistrate or mayor
without any demand on the part of the defendant. The
defendant may doubtless by conduct waive his right to
have the testimony so taken or estop himself from raising
objection on that ground, but the mere failure to demand
that the testimony be taken as required by law is not a
waiver. All that appears in this case is that the de-
fendant did not ask that the testimony be taken down in
writing and signed by the witnesses.
It might seem desirable in some mayor's courts, pressed
with numerous cases, to dispense with this requirement
which calls for some pains and consumption of time, but
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the- due protection of the party charged with crime in
his right of appeal and the means which compliance
with the statute would afford in preventing or punishing
perjury are weightier considerations.
See also Lake City v. Gilliland (1915), 101 S. C. 152, 85
S. E. 312.
It is always best in an important case to agree that the ste-
nographer of one of the attorneys be sworn and have that
person take down the testimony and also any motions or other
important judicial steps that enter into the trial. Then if
there is an appeal, a transcript can be had.
The testimony must always be reduced to writing and signed
by the witnesses. As pointed out in City of Sumter v. Hogan
(1913), 96 S. C. 302, 80 S. E. 497, at page 305:
The requirement that the testimony should be reduced
to writing, and signed by the witnesses during the trial,
related to the procedure, and the failure to comply with
it, was a mere irregularity which could be waived. City
of Abbeville v. Gooseby, 93 S. C. 370, 76 S. E. 977.
It was the duty of the defendant's attorney, to call the
court's attention to such irregularity as soon as he dis-
covered it, otherwise it would be deemed to have been
waived. State v. Norton, 69 S. C. 454, 48 S. E. 280.
The fact that the defendant's attorney gave notice, that
he would require the testimony to be reduced to writing,
did not absolve him from his duty to make such oversight
known, as soon as discovered, if he intended to rely upon
the objection, that there was a failure to comply with
said requirements, as a ground of appeal. Furthermore,
his request that the testimony should be reduced to writ-
ing was complied with. The reason of the rule is thus
stated in the case of Lee v. MeLeod, 15 Nev. 163: "A
party ought not to be permitted to take the chances of a
verdict in his favor, and wait until after the verdict is
rendered against him, before making any objection. If,
with a full knowledge of all the facts, he proceeds with
the trial and takes the chances, he ought, in justice and
fair dealing, to submit to the consequences."
[Vol. 11
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